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RECORD OF EVENTS

1st Battalion, 26th Infantry
(Attached to 3rd US Armored Division)

13 September - 22 September 1944

13 September 1944

On the morning of 13 September, the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry was detached from Task Force Hogan and put directly under the command of General Hickey (CCA). At 1130, therefore, it was instructed to assemble in the Aachen Eynatten woods (8635) in preparation for an attack against the outer defenses of the Siegfried Line.

The combat strength of the Battalion was 36 Off. and 550 EM.

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Off.</u>	<u>EM</u>
Hq. Co., 1st Bn.	7	88
Co. "A"	6	127
Co. "B"	6	108
Co. "C"	6	128
Co. "D"	<u>11</u>	<u>101</u>
	36	550

During the afternoon, armored infantry and tanks of Combat Command Hickey forced the Dragons Teeth (a set of AT defenses) on the north east side of the woods (K873360). The intensity of the enemy fire, however, caused those elements getting past the obstacles to turn East and proceed along a small draw. The hostile anti-tank, mortar, and artillery fire succeeded in stopping the infantry and destroying 12 of the tanks.

By 1830 more tanks of the Combat Command had succeeded in passing through the gap in the Dragons Teeth, and the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry,

was given the word to attack. Its advance across the open field separating the obstacles from the woods was in a column of companies, "A" Company leading. Elements of "B" company had been distributed among the three rifle companies. The mission of the battalion was the seizure of Nuthelm (890363). In stead of following the other elements of Combat Command Hickey, however, the commanding officer of the battalion, Major E. W. Adams, sent his men approximately 200 yards farther to the northeast, in order to secure cover from a low ridge immediately across the Dragons Teeth.

A platoon of tanks moved out of the woods with the infantry, but since the tanks couldn't cross the obstacles at this point they swung to the south, with the intention of rejoining the foot soldiers on the other side. The only contact ever established beyond the Dragons Teeth, however, was at 2000 hours with one tank carrying the artillery observer. Hence, throughout the evening the action, as far as the 1st Battalion was concerned, was strictly an infantry attack, without support of tanks, artillery, or aircraft.

As the infantry approached the obstacles, it came under fire from three directions. Heavy machine gun and sniper fire came from a house on the left flank on the near side of the obstacles, while from the front 120mm mortar and artillery of an unknown calibre rained down from the direction of Ober Forstbach. At the same time, intense fire was hitting the men from their right rear, apparently from some of the pillboxes in that direction. The leading elements of the column broke into a run while crossing through the Dragons Teeth in order to avoid being wiped out. As it was, the fire split "A" company, the leading two platoons continuing directly north, while the last platoon remained with the other two companies.

As darkness fell over the area, Companies "B" and "C" (plus 1 platoon of "A" Company) moved along the ridge in a northeasterly direction towards Nutheln. On its right at Werscheid, a farm house was burning brightly, furnishing a landmark to the battalion. Tanks were heard rolling up to the south of the battalion, and about 500 yards west of Nutheln contact was made with the armor, which proved to be elements of Task Force Dean. While the 1st Battalion prepared an all around defense for the night, Capt. Levasseur and a small patrol retraced their route towards the burning house at Werscheid in search of the rest of "A" Company.

In the confusion resulting from the intensive barrage near the Dragons Teeth, the leading elements of "A" Company lost direction and proceeded North towards Ober Forstbach, instead of swinging East towards Nutheln. Proceeding up the road, they passed without opposition by the first houses and reached the main crossroad at the northern part of the village. Meanwhile, on the right a patrol of four men worked its way along on the rear side of the houses and came upon a crew of 6 German soldiers asleep beside their 150mm gun. These men were captured without difficulty. An 88mm and one 105mm were found unmanned, as well as two 120mm mortars. These weapons were destroyed to the best of the Company's ability at the time. When the crossroad was reached, it became clear to the leading platoons that they had lost their way, and Capt. F. W. Anderson, "A" Company Commander, gave the order to return in the direction of the burning house at Werscheid. Thereupon, an enemy group which had remained quiet in the houses of Ober Forstbach opened up on the company, and a running fight developed as the platoons retraced their route to join the battalion. On reaching the ridge near the burning house the company met Capt. Levasseur, who guided it back to the rest of the battalion. "A"

Company reached the area at approximately 2400.

In this action the battalion had bypassed the pillboxes between the Dragons Teeth and Nuthelm. Some of them were apparently knocked out by the tanks previously, and except for some small arms fire the pillboxes did not give much trouble to the battalion in its attack.

14 - 15 September 1944

The Battalion Combat Strength was 54 Off. and 539 M1.

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Off.</u>	<u>M1.</u>
Hq. Co., 1st Bn.	7	86
Co. "A"	4	117
Co. "B"	6	108
Co. "C"	6	118
Co. "D"	<u>11</u>	<u>100</u>
	54	539

Throughout the day the battalion was engaged in consolidating its position at Nuthelm and in reducing the pillboxes between the village and the Dragons Teeth. At dawn, "B" Company was ordered to take over the crossroads in the center of the village, which it did by 0600. "A" company occupied Hill 290, to the south, and sent a patrol to Waldheim, which found the area clear of enemy. The mission of "C" company was the reduction of the pillboxes which had been by-passed the evening before. In this activity it was engaged throughout most of the day.

The reduction of the pillboxes was accomplished without engineers but with the aid of a 155 rifle mounted on a M-12 chassis. The infantry discovered the blind spot of the pillbox, and moved in to assist the approach of the 155. Then the pillbox was fired upon from a range of 100 yards. The result was to shake the guns loose inside the pillboxes and induce the occupants to surrender. The infantry had unsuccessfully tried grenades but

case under heavy cross fire from enemy machine guns before they could reach the pillbox opening. Most of the pillboxes in this area were large, holding from twelve to fifteen men. However, the task of "C" company was made appreciably easier by the fact that some of the pillboxes were not held by the enemy, having been either abandoned or knocked out the previous day. Without having broken through and there by approaching the fortifications from the rear, where the pillboxes had no field of fire, the assault of the infantry would have been extremely difficult.

During the afternoon of the 15th, Task Force Hogan arrived at Rurheim, and the 1st Battalion reverted to division reserve under its command. At 1800, the Task Force was ordered to the vicinity of Derff, where by riding 10 men or more on a tank and sending the rest by motor, the 1st battalion arrived about 2000.

16 September 1944

The Battalion Combat Strength was 33 Off. and 535 IM.

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Off.</u>	<u>IM</u>
Hq. Co., 1st Bn	7	86
Co. "A"	4	116
Co. "B"	6	111
Co. "C"	6	123
Co. "D"	<u>10</u>	<u>99</u>
	33	535

At 0900 the Task Force was assigned the mission of cleaning out Busbach and of penetrating the Dragons Teeth north of the town. One company of the 33rd Reconnaissance Battalion, believed to be "C", had made contact with the enemy at the crossroads in the southern outskirts of Busbach (K927402) and was holding the slopes on the Southwest of the

town.

"B" company of the 1st Battalion, Captain Edger Simon, Commanding, was given the main assignment, its task being to go north on the main street of Busbach and wipe out any enemy in the town. "A" company was ordered to take Hill 281, immediately east of the town, and with two platoons of tanks to protect the right flank of "B" company. "C" company was held as reserve.

In going through the town, "B" company made substantial progress throughout the day, until it reached the northernmost crossroads (KO28412), where enemy small arms fire about a road block stopped it. After this resistance was overcome, "B" company found itself at 1800 unable to move farther against anti-tank and machine gun fire. It had, during the afternoon, used a self-propelled 155 gun to fire from close range against a pillbox just across the Dragons Teeth on the right flank. Not only did it reduce the pillbox, but it broke every window in Busbach.

"A" company set out on foot for the village of Brockenberg (935400), which it reached about 1300 hours without difficulty. The pillboxes at 935402 were found unoccupied, and 14 prisoners of war were taken. As one tank crossed the ridge-line north of Brockenberg, it was knocked out by anti-tank fire from the area of the Dragons Teeth at 930418. While the 3rd platoon of the company dug in along the ridge, the other two platoons went downhill to the northeast, where in a gravel pit they found 2,000 civilians. Upon reaching the area of the pit, the platoons were pinned down temporarily by fire from pillboxes north on the hill across the valley.

In mid-afternoon, "A" company was ordered to leave one platoon on top of the hill and with the other two platoons take position on

the road just south of the Dragons Teeth, at approximately 935412. The movement was to begin after dark, but the nature of the ground and the darkness confused the two platoons and they continued north east into the suburbs of Stolberg. They halted at a railway overpass (943407), while the company commander and a patrol proceeded north in an effort to orientate the unit. It became evident that the company was not going to reach its objective that night, and therefore by radio the battalion commander ordered it to return to its original position. The elements reached this area about 0200 the following morning.

17 September. The Battalion Combat Strength 33 Off. 524 FM.

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Off.</u>	<u>FM</u>
Hq. Co., 1st Bn.	7	86
Co. "A"	4	116
Co. "B"	6	101
Co. "C"	6	125
Co. "D"	<u>10</u>	<u>96</u>
	33	524

In the morning, "A" company moved northwest from its position near Bauschenberg to the road junctions south of the Dragons Teeth and east of the positions held by "B" company. This action was carried out, and throughout the rest of the day the company fired on the anti-gun positions on the far side of the obstacles. It is believed that mortars succeeded in knocking out one of the hostile emplacements.

"B" company consolidated its position.

17-18 September

At 1500 hours 17 September, "C" company was ordered to move from its position to the west of Busbach toward the southern tip of Stolberg, where its commanding officer, Capt. Allen Ferry, received

orders directly from Lt. Col. Kolborne concerning a special mission. The company was to move through the town of Diepenlinchen, envelope from the east the factory at Weissenberg and seize the sand heaps behind it. Previously a battalion of the 36th Armored Infantry had been pushed off the position, suffering severe losses. As a secondary mission, therefore, "C" company was to secure the area to rescue as many as possible of the wounded from the other battalion.

"C" company reached the factory at Diepenlinchen about 1930, at dusk, and began to move round the factory, where it was met by small arms and machine gun fire coming from the factory buildings. The 2nd platoon, which led the column in front of the 6 supporting tanks, was completely disorganized by the intense enemy fire. In order to keep the company from being wiped out, Capt. Ferry ordered it to withdraw to a point 903416, the road junction just south of the town. At this place the company organized for the night.

At 0430, 18th September, the company again moved off towards its objective, this time going to the left of the factory through the piles of rock. The entire company was ahead of the tanks, which were left in the grove of trees to cover the advance. About 0630 as the company cleared the trees and deployed in the gravel piles, it was met by a heavy artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire. It was pre-zered in. The enemy had allowed the company to advance into the piles before firing on it.

The 2nd platoon, now at the rear was ordered to withdraw to its previous position, and the rest of the company was to follow. As it retired, it suffered heavy losses. At the same time the enemy infantry came around from the east side of the factory area and counterattacked, reaching the road junction.

Thereupon the 2nd platoon withdrew to "I" Co. of the 38th Inf., and formed a small perimeter defense in the woods (southwest of Diepenlinchen). Other elements of the company which drew back were put in support. The enemy had used rifle, MG, and 20MM in the counter attack, while intense and coordinating artillery came from the factory at Weissenberg.

"C" company had at the start 110 men, but only 20 were present to organize for a defense. Later the number rose to 40-50, but when "C" company attacked with the rest of the battalion, there were 39 men on hand. In the morning, Capt. Ferry was missing in action.

18 September.

The Battalion Combat Strength was 35 Off. and 533 EM.

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Off.</u>	<u>EM</u>
Hq. Co., 1st Bn.	7	88
Co. "A"	4	120
Co. "B"	6	107
Co. "C"	6	120
Co. "D"	<u>10</u>	<u>98</u>
	35	533

The remaining companies of the 1st battalion were ordered to move at 0520 towards Diepenlinchen, with the eventual mission of turning ^{west} Northeast and capturing Donnerberg. A company mounted tanks and trucks rode, making a wide circle south through Dorff, towards the road junction at 961410, at which point the column came under enemy artillery fire. In view of the uncertain situation at Diepenlinchen and Weissenberg, the eventual objective of Donnerberg was abandoned and the two companies ordered to attack the enemy at Weissenberg. The order for the change in plans came at 1100, when General Rose ordered Col. Welborne to have Task

Force Hogan, consisting of only two companies of tanks and the 1st Bn, 26th Infantry, to move northeast against the enemy.

In the redefinition of the mission, "B" company was assigned the task of taking Diepenlinchen, with a view eventually to enveloping the enemy at Weissenburg from the right. "A" company was ordered to the edge of the woods (964410-966418), in preparation for a frontal attack against the factory area at Weissenberg.

"A" company dismounted upon receiving the artillery fire, and began its advance towards Diepenlinchen. The infantry worked their way along the edge of the woods to the southwest of the town, while the tanks crossed fields on their right flank. The intensity of the enemy artillery increased as the troops moved towards the northwest ^{east} edge of the woods.

"A" company, using the edge of the woods as a line of departure, attacked at 1700 across the field towards the factory at Weissenberg. The area offered a perfect field of fire for the enemy, and the attack was repulsed. Three tanks and 14 men fell before heavy fire from machine guns, small arms, mortar, artillery, and 20mm anti-aircraft guns. The men withdrew to the road which cuts across the pasture, and dug in for the night.

"B" company on the right moved into Diepenlinchen against stubborn resistance. House to house fighting throughout the afternoon resulted in the capture of the slag heap at 968418 but not the factory itself.

"C" company, in the meantime, was further reorganized in the woods behind "A" company. Sent out on the right flank of the Task Force, it worked slowly along the road leading from the south into Diepenlinchen, and held its position from 962412 to 1966416 for the night.

19 September.

The Battalion Combat Strength 28 Off. and 436 FM.

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Off.</u>	<u>EM.</u>
Hq. Co., 1st Bn.	7	88
Co. "A"	4	96
Co. "B"	5	91
Co. "C"	2	62
Co. "D"	<u>10</u>	<u>101</u>
	28	436

In the morning at 0800, the battalion continued its attack, with "B" company working farther into Die, enlinchen. The company secured the factory in the town and proceeded against heavy fire through approximately 100 yards of rock pile, receiving bazooka, grenade, machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire from the enemy.

At 1430, General Boudinot ordered a general coordinated attack against the Weissenberg area to begin at 1600. Task Force Hogan was to operate in three prongs. "C" company on the right flank was to swing around to the east in an effort to envelop the enemy position. "B" company was to continue through the rock piles towards the eastern part of the enemy stronghold. "A" company was to continue its efforts across the field in the front. At the same time Task Force Levelady was to go Northwest, across the field on the left of "A" company and secure the western edge of the woods of which the strongpoint at Weissenberg formed the eastern part.

At 1600, "C" and "B" companies attacked as planned. "C" company lost two tanks to heavy artillery, anti-tank, and mortar fire in its efforts on the far right, and withdrew to reorganize again. "B" company managed to gain another 200 yards across the rock piles, but could not make further gains against the intense enemy fire. Major Adams held up "A" company, however, waiting until Task Force Levelady would move on his

left to give him support. Finally at 1900, the tanks with "A" company were ordered across the field, while the infantry remained in their holes until the fire of the enemy was disclosed. When the tanks received fire similar to that of the previous attack, they withdrew, and the infantry remained in its position without attempting to cross the field. Prisoners of War Reports the following day disclosed that the attack of the tanks came just as the enemy was organizing an attack of its own. The tank fire therefore cut the enemy to pieces in the woods, and dissolved the enemy counterattack before it began.

While the fire-fight between the tanks with "A" company and the enemy was in progress, Task Force Lovelady moved across the field and secured its immediate objective at the western part of the woods, thus putting its troops in a position to flank the enemy.

During the evening, General Boudinot ordered a third attack against the Weissenberg fortress-factory. The mission of "A" company and "B" company were the same as before. "C" company, however, was withdrawn in order to move up on the left flank of "A" company and to contact elements of Task Force Lovelady.

20 September

The Battalion Combat Strength 25 Off. 416 FM.

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Off.</u>	<u>FM</u>
Hq. Co., 1st Bn	7	86
Co. "A"	5	91
Co. "B"	5	83
Co. "C"	5	61
Co. "D"	<u>7</u>	<u>95</u>
	25	416

At 0800, as planned, "A" and "B" companies made the attack. The

tactics of "A" company, however, were reversed from the previous two efforts. The infantry was sent forward without artillery preparation or tank support. Aided by a heavy ground haze, they advanced without being detected by the enemy to the factory itself. The Germans were caught off guard, many of them were asleep, and within an hour the factory which successfully had withstood two attacks fell to the infantry. "B" company on the right also made good progress through the rock piles and reached the east side of the factory at 0930. The enemy had recovered from his surprise, however, by this time, and the rear elements of "B" company received heavy artillery fire as they closed in on the objective. Finally, by sending individuals forward man by man, the rest of the company was infiltrating across the open rock piles to Weissenberg. "C" company had little difficulty in crossing on the left of "A" company and contacting elements of Task Force Lovelady.

At 1130 the entire area of the factory and the woods to the west were secured by Task Force Hogan, including 1st Bn., 26th Infantry. Task Force Lovelady moved off at 1200 on a mission to the east, and two hours later the battalion was informed that elements of the 47th Infantry would relieve them. The 3rd Battalion of the 47th Infantry closed on the area by 2300, and thereupon the 1st battalion, 26th Infantry reassembled in the woods at 957414.

According to Prisoner of War Reports, the attacking forces had been up against the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 89th Infantry, 12th Infantry Division, which had moved to that area the day before. One battalion in Weissenberg, and the other behind the slag heaps at the east. The enemy mission had been to sweep the American forces from Diepenlinchen and the woods southwest of it, to retake the pillboxes south of the woods, and to remain the line against the efforts of the American forces to pierce it at this point.

The coordinated efforts of the enemy were clear in his effective use of artillery against the American forces. Apparently he had an excellent Observation Post, from which he zeroed in by means of mortar fire, and then transmitted the findings to the 150mm and 105mm artillery. After the objective was taken, moreover, the American forces received heavy artillery on the position itself.

21 September

The Battalion Combat Strength 27 Off. and 377 FM.

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Off.</u>	<u>FM</u>
Hq. Co., 1st Bn	7	86
Co. "A"	3	79
Co. "B"	5	64
Co. "C"	3	61
Co. "D"	<u>7</u>	<u>37</u>
	27	377

During the evening of 20 September, General Boudinot had ordered Task Force Commander Hogan to attack in a westerly direction to take the town of Stolberg. After the severe fighting of the previous days, the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry had 404 men left, many of them wounded but not evacuated. The tank battalion was reduced to two companies, having between them a total of 12 medium and 4 light tanks.

The attack planned for 0700 started out as scheduled, but the advance was temporarily held up on the hillside east of the town, while elements explored for a proper route into the town itself. During the half-hour that the tanks and infantry remained in the open, the enemy did not fire upon them, but just as the push was renewed the hostile artillery opened up. The infantry had already reached the town, except for some rear elements, and thus largely escaped annihilation, while the tanks were

destroyed, and the remaining troops raced the AT fire into the town.

The infantry, which reached the southern outskirts of the town by 1130, entered upon an afternoon of typical street fighting. Hostile anti-tank, small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire faced them throughout the rest of the day. It became a matter of cleaning out the area, house by house, of kicking in doors, lobbing grenades, and fighting at close range. By evening elements of "A" company had reached at point 940419, approximately one-third the distance up the snake-like structure of the town.

22 September 1944

Battalion Combat Strength 25 Off. and 343 Inf.

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Off.</u>	<u>Inf</u>
Hq. Co., 1st Bn	8	84
Co. "A"	5	63
Co. "B"	5	68
Co. "C"	5	48
Co. "D"	<u>6</u>	<u>60</u>
	25	343

The advance north through Stolberg was resumed early in the morning. The 1st Battalion split its forces. "A" company advanced up the main street (Adolphe Hitler Strasse), reaching the cross-street at 934482 with little resistance, but at that point it received tank, machine gun, and small arms fire. "B" company moved along a parallel street to the west of "A" company, and it reached approximately the same point before meeting similar enemy fire. Hasty mines laid by the enemy were covered with bricks and dirt as camouflage. The situation remained relatively constant thereafter, with "A" and "B" companies holding their positions. "A" company secured a position with good fields of fire and observation but concealed from the enemy.

"C" company, in the meantime had been given the mission of clearing out the southern part of the town, and upon its return it moved up to the right flank of the battalion.

Task Force Lovelady, which had been in position on the high ground near Donherberg (941438) planned to attack at 0800. It was held up first by lack of fuel, and then by command of General Boudinot, in view of the relatively easy advance of the 1st battalion, 26th Infantry. However, the Task Force was committed at 1130 to secure the road net to the Southeast. At the same time, Major Adams was notified that he would be relieved by elements of the 26th Armored Infantry when his battalion reached its objective in the northern part of Stolberg. At 1500, word came that the relief would be immediate, and by 1700 the 1st battalion was pulled out of the front line.

On 23 September the battalion returned to 1st Division control.

During the period of 13 September 1944 through 22 September 1944, the battalion had sustained the following casualties:

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA-Evacc.</u>		<u>WIA-non-evacc.</u>		<u>INJURED IA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>PM</u>	<u>OFF.</u>	<u>PM</u>	<u>PM</u>	<u>OFF.</u>	<u>PM</u>
27	6	127	5	21	5	1	40.

1ST BATTALION MEDICAL DETACHMENT
26TH INFANTRY

MEDICAL DETACHMENT RECORD OF EVENTS
(as derived from statements of 2nd
Lieutenant John J. Lewis, Assis-
tant Surgeon, 1st Battalion, Medical
Detachment, 26th Infantry)

28 September 1944

13 - 14 - 15 September 1944

The first three days saw the 1st Battalion Medical Detachment take care of the casualties incurred in breaking through the outer defenses of the Siegfried Line. The heaviest action occurred in the next seven days.

16 September 1944

At Dorff, Germany the Medical Detachment was awakened at 0600 hours; a civilian woman was in labor and about to bear a child. Capt. Terwedow and assistant were with the woman for approximately 2½ hours. The child was delivered at 0830, to the best of our knowledge the first German baby attended by a medical officer of the American Army in Germany. At approximately 1000 hours orders were given committing the battalion in the attack against Busbach. Captain Terwedow sent us to establish a forward aid station with a ½ ton truck and one S/Sgt., one Sgt. and two litter squads. The truck was to be sent up to the Dragon's Teeth (a set of anti tank defenses and pillboxes). Heavy artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire was encountered on the move to set up the forward station.

As we moved through town we met with considerable sniper ^{FIRE} but the forward aid station was established at approximately 1600 hours. About 2200 hours, German patrols infiltrated into the "B" Co. area, and in the heavy fire fight that followed, the company suffered nine casualties. A call was sent

out for aid men. Cpl. Murphy, jeep driver, Sgt. Delaney, Pfc. Lobban, T/4 LeBlanc, Pvt. Pappaport and Pfc. Stolarski accompanied me to the "B" company area. It was pitch black dark, and more by sense of direction than anything else we found our way to the casualties. The fire fight was still in progress, with the company trying to cut off the German patrol that was attempting to withdraw to its own lines. A forward aid station was established in the house to which the casualties in the area were carried. The aid men were under constant fire from both sides. Priority in evacuation was given to five of the seriously wounded men. Under fire, the medical vehicle, taking three casualties at a time, made three round trips to the rear aid station.

Heavy artillery fire fell in and about the town all during the night.

17 September 1944

"C" Company, 26th Infantry was detached from the battalion and, with one company of tanks was ordered to push to our right flank and attack in that sector. They moved through the approach areas under heavy artillery fire. As they attacked that night at 2300 hours, it was so dark that it couldn't see its own flanks. The company advanced and fell into a neatly planned German trap. The Germans let them advance without firing a shot. As they were about to consolidate positions in town for the night, the Germans let go with everything they had. It was a fierce fire and it lasted throughout the night. "C" Company, subjected to intense fire of all calibre weapons and fierce enemy infantry attacks, suffered heavy casualties. Pvts. Gonzales, T/5 Henderson and Pvt. Visk, the three aid men with the company, worked feverishly without sleeping the whole night. When the company was ordered to pull back, Pvt. Gonzales, having casualties he knew couldn't be moved, elected to stay with them. The remainder of the company fought to withdraw through the Germans who had encircled the position. Complete darkness made reorganization impossible and

contact between platoons was lost. Pvt. Visk alternately supported and half-carried two seriously wounded men for a full 400 yards back to a place of safety in a pillbox, and returned through enemy lines many times during the night, evacuating a number of the wounded. T/5 Henderson was ordered by the acting Company Commander, (Captain Ferry was already missing in action), to treat the wounded, at which job he worked steadily for a period of seven hours. By that time dawn was approaching and help was on its way. The rest of the battalion had been diverted from Busbach to attack the Diepinlinchin defenses at 0630 hours.

18 September 1944

Troops moving into the attack met heavy and accurate artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire. The advancing battalion column met the remnants of "C" Company which had fought all night to get out of the German trap. The forward aid station was set up in a house about 75 yards in advance of the Battalion CP and worked busily at treating the casualties that poured in during the early morning hours. About 10-15 litter hauls were made over very rough terrain and under punishing enemy artillery and mortar fire. The aid station, though clearly marked, was hit by two artillery shells at 1350 hours.

The battalion reached its objective.

Orders were received that the battalion was to attack again at 1530 hours, at which time movement forward began. Many casualties were incurred in the heavy fighting of the next two hours. The battalion was meeting very accurate machine gun fire. Being in the direct line of fire, the aid station was hit by machine gun bullets which made work in that vicinity extremely hazardous. Litter squads were making long hauls to the aid station, and the fighting raged throughout the town. At 2245 hours T/5 Merrill reported that both litter squads working in town had been hit by artillery fire. Sgt. Delaney, T/4 LeBlanc, and I went

(4)

forward to investigate. ~~Six~~^{Seven} litter bearers out of eight had been wounded (~~and~~
~~_____~~, T/3 Morgan, T/4 Stolarski, T/5 Merrill, Pfc. Trocola, Pvt. Kilander,
Pvt. Sebczyk, and Pvt. Hunt). Suffering casualties as we did, it was necessary
for the Medical Detachment to call back to the rear aid station for replacements.
Approximately twenty litter hauls were made that night in evacuating casualties.
Thirty of the walking wounded cases were treated. All this took place under fire
that veteran aid men of the detachment claimed was the most intense fire to which
they had ever been subjected. No one in the forward aid station slept that night.

19 September 1944

At dawn we were still under heavy artillery fire, this same fire wounding
another twenty men up forward. The aid men who had worked all night and were
utterly fatigued willingly and voluntarily left the aid station upon hearing re-
ports of the casualties. They had no sooner left when a heavy shell hit one
corner of the aid station. Wounded men who had been treated and were awaiting
evacuation were moved into the cellar when more shells hit the building. The
artillery fire swept the area all afternoon and most of the evening. A litter
squad worked forward advancing in the face of intense artillery and machine gun
fire. A terrific barrage kept the squad pinned down in the area for forty-five
minutes. All through this fire T/5 Goad worked on some wounded in the nearby
gully. As soon as the barrage eased eleven men were evacuated. After insuring
that all cases had been treated, the group returned to the aid station. Again
heavy artillery fire throughout the night made sleep impossible.

20 September 1944

If such were possible the enemy shelling intensified during the morning
and soon there was a call for medics. A litter squad went up forward. It
reached two casualties, gave them first aid treatment, and was ordered to come
back with another litter squad in order to pick up the remaining patients plus

the other casualty who still lay in an area under heavy fire. The advance up the road towards the wounded man was taken under fire from two snipers, one armed with a rifle and the other with a machine pistol. The squad took cover in the ditch beside the road. The casualty lay in the ditch on the opposite side of the road approximately 60 yards ahead of it. Each time the squad tried to move it drew fire though the Red Crosses were plainly visible. The "B" company commander, seeing the situation, ordered a tank to fire three rounds at the house in which the snipers were. Both snipers were silenced by the tank fire. When the wounded man was reached it was too late; he had bled to death. In my estimation the man would have lived if proper medical attention could have been given him, and that medical attention would have been given him had it not been for that critical fifteen minutes' delay. That morning two more medical detachment men were sent back to the rear aid station because of blast concussion suffered while bringing back a casualty. When two companies of the 9th Division were sent up to relieve the battalion, we pulled back into a bivouac area at 2200 hours. Little sleep was obtained that night since attack orders came ordering the battalion to assault enemy positions in the vicinity of the city of Stolberg, Germany.

21 September 1944

Two jeeps, S/Sgt Sheedy, jeep drivers Cpl. Murphy and Pvt. Chernak, and two litter squads moved up in the rear of the attacking companies. An aid station was located in a pillbox on the summit of the hill overlooking Stolberg. Throughout the morning and afternoon we treated and evacuated wounded from our own battalion and from the 33rd Armored Regiment.

About 1500 hours a runner from the 33rd Armored Medics reported that one of their men lay wounded about 250 yards down the slope. A medical detachment detail of T/4 LeBlanc, Pvt. Rock, Pvt. Rappaport, T/5 Goad and myself reached the

casualty and administered essential first aid. Prior to sending the casualty back to the rear aid station, a terrific artillery barrage was laid on the ~~the~~ area. One tank about 200 yards away from our pillbox was hit. Upon arriving at the tank T/4 LeBlanc, Pvt. Rappaport, and T/5 Goad discovered a wounded soldier lying beside the tank. While T/4 LeBlanc climbed atop the tank to see if there were any more survivors, T/5 Goad treated the wounded man. The tank crew members being dead, the litter squad started to return to the aid station. Half way there, two more tanks were knocked out by the artillery barrage. The litter squad, placing the patient they were carrying under cover, raced to the two burning tanks. T/4 LeBlanc and T/5 Goad climbed inside the burning tank and passed two wounded tank men to the litter squad. Ammunition ~~from~~ the burning tanks was exploding by this time, and the two casualties were placed under nearby cover, while the squad returned to the aid station with their original patient. At the aid station, at the time the other two tanks were knocked out, we saw that the group had all it could do to handle the patients from that second tank, and accordingly Sgt. Delaney and I set out to the third tank. Another artillery barrage ranged in on the area, and we hit the dirt. Luckily no one was hit then. We again advanced toward the tank and as we neared it three more shells came over. Not hearing them we did not hit the ground. Sgt. Delaney was killed immediately.

While evacuating patients from the area Cpl. Murphy and Pvt. Chernak, both jeep drivers of medical vehicles which had been disabled by artillery fire, proceeded through the very difficult terrain and right in the midst of the fiercest barrage of the day, to the AT area where the fire had caused casualties. Just as they arrived in that area, about ten shells fell close by. Cpl. Murphy had his clothes ripped by fragments and Pvt. Chernak suffered serious wounds about the legs. Pvt. Chernak, disregarding the painful wounds, treated casualties, placed them under cover, and then walked 200 yards to the 33rd Armored aid station.

At 1700 hours Captain Terwedow consolidated both forward and rear aid stations, since casualties of the past few days had taken heavy toll of the small medical detachment. Sometime during the night, the artillery shelling ceased.

September 22 1944

After about three hours sleep, the detachment followed the companies that were attacking the town at dawn. By 1100 hours the foot troops had forced entrance into the town, into which the forward aid station was moved. Throughout the morning and part of the afternoon, the aid men treated and evacuated those casualties suffered in the street fighting. In the "C" Company area, the detachment was taken under fire by snipers who wounded one of the casualties they were evacuating. Captain Terwedow treated this case, and then administered three units of plasma to the badly wounded soldier. Seeing that a whole blood transfusion was necessary if the patient's life was to be saved, a 3rd Armored half-track ambulance was commandeered and the casualty rushed to the nearest hospital.

No more casualties were sustained from that time until we pulled out of town late that afternoon. The battalion was relieved approximately 1800 hours.

On the 23rd of September we moved back to our own Divisional and Regimental area.

ROSTER
1ST MEDICAL DETACHMENT,
26TH INFANTRY
(As of 23 September 1944)

NAME	GRADE	CASUALTIES
Terwedow, Henry A.	Captain (MC)	WIA 9-16 & 9-21 Not Hosp.
Lewis, John J.	2nd Lt. (MAC)	
Sheedy, Robert W.	S/Sgt.	
Bozarth, Donald F.	T/3	
Dewey, Herbert K.	T/3	
Morgan, Dave L.	T/3	WIA 9-18 Hosp.
Kratzmeier, Bernard V.	T/4	
LeBlanc, Joseph L. F.	T/4	WIA 9-21 Not Hosp.
Stolarski, Stanley	T/4	WIA 9-18 Hosp.
Delaney, Ernest C.	T/4	KIA 9-18
Murphy, Mark J.	Cpl.	
Merrill, Joseph L.	T/5	WIA 9-18 Hosp.
Overholt, Claude A.	T/5	
Ryder, Larry C.	T/5	Abs. sick 9-17
Summers, Oren	T/5	
Puma, Sam G.	T/5	WIA 9-22 Not Hosp.
Goad, Louis G.	T/5	WIA 9-21 Not Hosp.
Trocola, Joseph T.	Pfc.	WIA 9-18 Not Hosp.
Wissinger, John D.	Pfc.	
Nickum, James D.	Pfc.	
Lobban, Donald R.	Pfc.	
LaRose, Orville B. Jr.	Pfc.	
Gonzales, James I.	Pfc.	MIA 9-19
Overturf, William L.	Pfc.	Abs. sick 9-20
Smith, Robert R.	Pfc.	
Stroud, Herman H.	Pfc.	
Gonyea, Ralph H.	Pvt.	
Kilander, Harry M.	Pvt.	WIA 9-18 Hosp.
Happaport, Herbert I.	Pvt.	
Beck, Gerald M.	Pvt.	WIA 9-22 Hosp.
Sebezyk, Walter J.	Pvt.	WIA 9-18 Hosp.
Chernek, John	Pvt.	WIA 9-21 Hosp.
Turner, George L.	Pvt.	
Beeves, James T.	Pvt.	
Poli, Fred	Pvt.	LIA 9-21 Not Hosp.
Henderson, June C.	Pvt.	
Visk, Felix K.	Pvt.	
Hunt, Rodney B.	Pvt.	WIA 9-18 Hosp.
Tremble, William G.	Pvt.	

ROSTER
 1ST MEDICAL DETACHMENT,
 26TH INFANTRY
 (As of 13 September 1944)

NAME	GRADE	ASN
Terwedow, Henry A.	Captain (MC)	0-418783
Lewis, John J.	2nd Lt. (MAC)	0-2049314
Sheedy, Robert W.	Staff Sgt.	12022909
Bozarth, Donald F.	Tec. 3rd Gr.	36042149
Dewey, Herbert K.	Tec. 3rd Gr.	6977218
Morgan, Dave L.	Tec. 3rd Gr.	7009148
Delaney, Ernest C.	Tec. 4th Gr.	17067179
Kratzmeier, Bernard	Tec. 4th Gr.	35139049
LeBlanc, Joseph L.F.	Tec. 4th Gr.	11013657
Stolarski, Stanley	Tec. 4th Gr.	36170131
Murphy, Mark J.	Cpl.	11018789
Merrill, Joseph L.	Tec. 5th Gr.	31108231
Overholt, Claude A.	Tec. 5th Gr.	36169986
Ryder, Larry C.	Tec. 5th Gr.	36333244
Summers, Oren	Tec. 5th Gr.	36072965
Puma, Sam G.	Tec. 5th Gr.	32932149
Goad, Louis G.	Tec. 5th Gr.	6720340
Trocola, Joseph T.	Pvt. 1st Cl.	32762887
Wissinger, John D.	Pvt. 1st Cl.	37180547
Nickum, James D.	Pvt. 1st Cl.	33688644
Lobban, Donald R.	Pvt. 1st Cl.	31347146
LaRose, Orville B. Jr	Pvt 1st Cl.	12214908
Gonzales, James I.	Pvt. 1st Cl.	36857656
Overturf, William L.	Pvt. 1st Cl.	32932669
Smith, Robert R.	Pvt. 1st Cl.	33536192
Stroud, Herman H.	Pvt. 1st Cl.	38386206
Gonyea, Ralph H.	Private	32857613
Kilander, Harry M.	Private	35371359
Appaport, Herbert I.	Private	32902612
Lock, Gerald M.	Private	33606412
Lebczyk, Walter J.	Private	35686393
Chernek, John	Private	12001015
Turner, George L.	Private	34734135
Reeves, James T.	Private	34821922
Poli, Fred	Private	31335152
Handerson, June C.	Private	32664309
Visk, Felix K.	Private	36683174
Hant, Rodney B.	Private	39200611
Tremble, William G.	Private	32932529

Material from Cpl. Fuller, HQ 16th Inf Regt
Outer Defenses of the Siegfried Line

The ditches and mined areas were the first barriers. The ditches, 12' wide, 4' deep, were 75 yds in front of the dragon's teeth. The rows of dragon's teeth loomed up like a sea of flat-topped pyramids.

A dragon's tooth (one tetrahedral barrier) was 2'9" in height, 2'6" in width at the base, 5'1" in length at the base, 11" wide at the top, 1'1" in length at the top. The connecting steel bars between the teeth were 2'6" and in some places 4'7". The teeth, commencing from a concrete wall 2'3" in height above the surface of the ground which was 24" thick, topped by steel pegs 2" above the concrete, ranged from the given measurements to the given measurements to the following at the other end of the row: 4'10" in height, 7'7" length at base, 2'8" width at base, 11" width at top, 1'1" length at top.

Interlaced with these rows were supporting rows (in stagger formation, row behind row of tetrahedral obstacles, so that no opening existed) joined in depth by concrete barriers 2'7" in length and width at the base; 3'4" in height, 9" square at top.

From concrete wall to concrete wall, a row of teeth averaged 44'. The cross-section interior of a concrete tooth consisted of 5 steel rods crossed by 3 steel rods.

Behind the dragon's teeth and on commanding ground covering all approaches to the antitank ditches and concrete barriers were a series of concrete installations of pillboxes and emplacements. The pillboxes averaged 87' in circumference, 6' in depth from top to bottom inside, and were expertly and completely covered, exclusive of the turrets, with brush and long grass. Tree stumps blocked approaches to these well camouflaged bunkers.

The pillboxes averaged 20-30 feet by 40-50 feet, and ~~2x25~~ 20-25 feet in height, of which at least half was below the ground. The walls and roofs were 3 feet thick, reinforced with steel. Many bunkers had storage space for great

quantities of ammunition; combat barracks (bunks) for platoons of defenders; steel doors; ventilator systems.

Surrounding these pillboxes were trenches bristling with MG nests, AT guns, open earthworks for heavier artillery.

Tank turret pillboxes were flanked by MG positions. The only approach to these camouflaged fortresses were ditches, 20" wide, 4' deep. Surrounded by trees, with foliage and brush in the background, the pillboxes were well concealed. These tank turret pillboxes were usually situated near crossroads with rotary field of fire in all directions ranging from 250 to 400 yards of open, commanding observation. ~~The turret pillboxes~~ The turrets were 19' in circumference, 2'6" above the ground, 3" thick (steel), with 6 apertures and 6 peep holes.

There were pillboxes at junctions, placed in such a manner to give each other support. These were 5' in height, 6' in width, 16'3" in length with five-foot covering of logs and dirt. All strongpoints were supported by automatic weapons.

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Penetration of the Siegfried Line by the 16th Inf. Regt.

At 111420 Sept the 1st Bn was ordered to move out of HERVE, and take HENRI CHAPPELL and the high ground surrounding it. Moved out with the HERVE AACHEN road as the boundary between "A" Co on the left and "C" Co on the right deployed two platoons abreast. "B" Co was following "C" Co.

One platoon of medium tanks was following "A" and a platoon of light tanks was following "C". The tanks were moving across country. Two TD's were supporting each platoon of tanks.

The Bn arrived in the vicinity of HENRI CHAPPELL by 1800 and went into defensive positions there.

On the 12th Sept. the I and R platoon was given the mission of preceding the 1st Bn from HENRI CHAPPELL into the woods in the vicinity of square (82-38) just inside the old German border.

They used trails rather than roads because the latter were frequently under observation by the enemy who had them zeroed in. Their mission was to find possible routes of advance for the troops that followed.

In the vicinity of (798356) they were fired on by seven rounds of what appeared to be an AA battery. No casualties were inflicted, but the jeeps were moved back about 500 yards while they took up an outpost and observed for about an hour.

The platoon then circled to the left of the point where they had been shelled and dismounted vicinity (817366). Sgt. Stockwell and four other EM moved about a mile north to (818378) observing two enemy tanks. They then made contact with the 1st Bn about 1930 hours.

The same day the 1st Bn still leading the 16th Regt moved out with the objective of taking the high ground in the vicinity (8238). Were deployed the same as the preceding day until they reached a point in the vicinity of (743333) where they left the road and moved across country to RJ (793360). They then followed

the road thru HERGENRATH, turning north to EJ (801373), turning right across the RR tracks across country to their objective arriving about 2000 hrs. (See overlay) The 1st Bn had crossed the German border vicinity (812377) by 1630.

They encountered small pockets of resistance, most of which was along the HERVE AACHEN road. While going into position "A" Co overran an 88mm flak battery of four guns.

At 2100 hrs "A" Co was counterattacked on its front and left flank by a company of about 80 men. The enemy marched right into machine gun fire and were "moved down". The attack followed a "tremendous artillery barrage," which began again and continued all night long and into the next morning.

At 0830 the same day (12 Sept) the 3d Bn was assembling in square (7229). Moved out column of companies. I Company was in the lead riding on one platoon medium tanks, one platoon light tanks and one platoon of TD's, plus one platoon heavy machine guns. Behind "I" Co came the Bn AT platoon of three 57mm towed AT guns. Then came "M" Co and the jeeps, followed by "L" and "K" Cos each mounted on five 2 1/2 ton (kitchen) trucks.

From LANTZEN they followed the road northeast of RJ (799346) where "I" Co turned right going to EYNATTEN where they spent the night. The rest of the Bn moved toward HAUSET where "K" and "L" Cos dismounted vicinity (8235). "K" went into positions vicinity (822352) while "L" Co continued northeast to vicinity (830360).

The Bn had a quiet night except that Corps' artillery laid down a barrage on "I" Co area, wounding eight men from "I" Co, killing two and wounding two from "M" Co and wounding one from Hdqts Co.

In the meantime the 2d Bn had moved to vicinity (784338) where they spent the night without incident.

On the 13th Sept. the I and R platoon remained in the vicinity of regt. CP near HAUSET, cleaning and repairing equipment.

The 1st Bn had "the hell shelled out of us" and "casualties were streaming into the CP." At 1000 hrs "C" Co was counterattacked by a company of about 80 men, attacking their right flank from the east and northeast.

The enemy attacked, yelling and screaming, thru the thickly wooded terrain and got right into their positions. One BAR man was later found dead beside his gun, his magazines all empty and 12 enemy dead around his position. About 1045 hrs two light tanks were moved up and "blasted" into the enemy with their 37mm gun and machine guns. By noon the attack had been repulsed and 12 PsW had been taken. During the 24 hours preceding the Bn had suffered 78 casualties.

At 1300 the 3d Bn of the 26th Inf Regt began to relieve this Bn, who reassembled in the vicinity of HERGENRATH.

The same day "I" Co moved north out of KYNATTEN on the road riding on tanks to RJ (838362), where they dismounted and went into an assembly area. Patrols were sent out to the northeast to pick probable tank routes.

The company deployed in a column of platoons, the tanks following, prepared to move up on call. They followed the route shown to (845375) where they made contact with the enemy. They engaged the enemy with light machine gun and rifle fire while making reconnaissance for the use of the tanks.

The three rifle platoons were deployed abreast. The platoon of medium tanks, the light tanks and TD's were deployed right with the rifle men. An intense five minute artillery barrage was laid down on the enemy, following which every weapon in the company opened fire after which not a shot was returned by the enemy. Yelling and screaming the company attacked. Everybody in three pillboxes and surrounding entrenchments surrendered. (Capt Kimball R. Richmond, then CO of "I" Co believes that yelling boosts the morale of the men while demoralizing the enemy.)

In the meantime "L" Co moved up the EUPEN AACHEN road. The company moved in a column of platoons with a point 300 yds to the front. A platoon of heavy

machine guns and a platoon of 81mm mortars from "M" Co were attached.

At about (837373) the point ran into small arms fire coming from (838375) and the emplacements to the west. They also began getting fire from three 88's in position along the road (east to west) just north of the Dragons Teeth.

One platoon was deployed south of the Dragons Teeth just along the border, while another platoon attempted to push up the road but without success so were brought back and deployed on a line with the other platoon. In the meantime two TD's were brought up to fire at the emplacements. An attempt was then made to work a platoon around thru the edge of the woods on the left and flank the enemy. This platoon was pinned down by enemy fire in vicinity (832374). They were withdrawn under cover of mortar fire. The company remained in the position for the night.

After "I" Co, cleared RJ (838362) "K" moved east to the KUPEN AACHEN road then going north, into position vicinity (839367) for the night.

That afternoon Lt. Wm. S. Joseph, Communications Officer of Hdqts Co moved forward to lay wire to "I" Co. A guide met them at RJ (843374). With the Lt. were six jeeps belonging to the Hdqts Co and "I" Co. The guide turned left instead of right and led them into the enemy position.

The enemy allowed the party to advance until they were well surrounded and then an 88 opened fire scoring a direct hit on the lead jeep in which Lt. Joseph was riding. No casualties were caused but the jeep was knocked out.

All the men in the jeeps immediately sought cover. Finding himself and his men surrounded Lt. Joseph surrendered. Friendly artillery was falling in the area and the Americans kept hitting the ground. When one sergeant didn't get up fast enough to suit the enemy he was shot.

The captured group was then marched to a pillbox. The capture was seen by friendly troops and almost immediately fire from our artillery and from two TD'S fell on the pillbox.

Lt. Joseph told his captors that they were surrounded and to give up. Nine or ten were willing but two enemy sergeants (both "plenty mean") wouldn't let them. When the sergeants left the box the lieutenant led these nine or ten men out carrying a white flag.

The men on the two TD's seeing the procession got out of the vehicles to assist. Just as they did enemy machine gun fire opened on all of them captors and captured alike but causing no casualties. The TD men jumped back on their vehicles and blasted the pillbox with their remaining ammunition.

The sergeant who had been shot died that night while being evacuated to the rear. It was a pitch black night and the jeep carrying the wounded man was led down the trail by Lt. Joseph on foot.

(Sidelight: There were three 81mm mortars mounted on half tracks, which belonged to the tank battalion in addition to those of "M" Co. All the mortars were generally kept under company control and were fired mostly in battery. There were usually two units of ammunition available, which was not enough. A unit consisted of 175 rounds per gun. In addition enemy ammunition was used. Since coming to France "M" Co estimates they have fired 20,000 rounds of enemy mortar ammunition.)

In the meantime the 2d Bn had been ordered to move behind the 3d, 16th, thru HAUSET and to take the ground in the vicinity of (8339) square.

When they arrived at the 3d Bn CP (819349) they found the road blocked. At the same time, 1050 hrs., they were given a ~~new~~ new mission, that of taking BRAND and the ground between (886392) and (890403).

After being held up at the 3d Bn ~~CP~~ CP for a while the 2d turned right along the road to EYNATTEN then northeast on the main road to BRAND. The 3d A D claimed they were using this road and could not give the 2d clearance to use it. When the latter arrived in LICHTENBUSCH they found a platoon of A I and one of tanks belonging to the 3d A D.

They went into bivouac west of LICHTENBUSCH as shown. Contact established with the 3d Bn on the left but not on the right. The tanks (one platoon medium and one light attached to E Co) set up road blocks southwest of LICHTENBUSCH at CR (858359). Sporadic artillery fire which was being ~~main~~ directed at the 3d A. D. fell through the night.

On the 14th Sept. this Bn was given the mission of occupying the woods and ridge in the (8641) square and cutting the AACHEN BRAND road. They jumped off at 0800 with the road (see overlay) as the boundary between E and F Companies, E on the right, F on the left. Each company moved in an attack formation, the light tanks leading, and the medium tanks following along the road. G Co moved ~~wik~~ into "F" position until ordered forward.

After clearing the house on the border (855373) both assault companies got into a fire fight at RJ (855374) about 0915 hrs. At the same time both friendly and enemy artillery was falling on them, causing 23 casualties in "F" Co but none in "E" Co.

The ground to their front was wide open, and in addition "E" Co had to make a sweeping move in order to keep its left flank on the road which made a sharp bend at this point. Also "E" Co was receiving considerable small arms fire from east of the Dragons Teeth. They called for mortar and artillery fire on it, which was not very effective.

In the meantime the tanks had been moving up the road in column formation. A gully ran east and west just south of the border. Lt. Donald M. English, tank commander, had planned to work his six medium tanks up the right of the road toward the heaviest expected resistance but now with the infantry pinned down on both sides of the road, he swung his tanks across the road to the left. They then wheeled abreast across the open terrain blasting the pillboxes as they went. They then wheeled northeast across the main road LICHTENBUSCH to AACHEN

firing into the woods behind the Dragons Teeth on the right flank.

A road block just north of the RJ, which had previously been inspected by Lt. English (on foot) was bypassed. The tanks then turned northward across the open terrain firing to their front. The light tanks followed the mediums during ~~the fight~~ this maneuver.

After one of the tanks had fired at the pillbox (857379) a Frenchman walked out and surrendered. He was informed that he could surrender if he would go back to the box and get the others to give up. He accomplished his mission returning with three other PSW and a girl.

With the enemy fire on the right flank silenced and the pillboxes also quiet the two assault companies were able to move.

"E" Co called for smoke on the edge of the woods to the right. Under cover of the smoke they advanced to the Dragons Teeth (on the double) behind the tanks without trouble. In the meantime the 2d platoon had been sent into the woods to sweep it clear. They got into a fire fight and caused six casualties and drove the others off.

During the same time "F" Co switched platoons. One had suffered about 50 percent casualties during the shelling mentioned above. One platoon was sent thru the edge of the woods on the left, while the other advanced over the open ground to the Dragons Teeth. The platoon moving thru the woods had been expected to halt on line with the Dragons Teeth but instead moved on until they hit a trail vicinity (851383). Here they halted and waited for the balance of the company to move up.

Both "E" and "F" Companies moved north to the edge of the woods to provide protection for the Engineers to blow the Dragons Teeth. When they first attempted to blow the obstacles they found their charge much too small. Eventually they used 150-160 pounds of dynamite to blow seven teeth. A tank dozer filled in the ditch and a path over the blown teeth some 20-30 yards to the right of the road thru which the tanks moved. The road had been badly cratered in front of the

teeth so a route to the right required considerably less work.

In the meantime "G" Co had moved into position in vicinity (855374), where they saw some enemy moving around to the right of them. A squad was sent to investigate, taking with them the Frenchman captured above. The Frenchman was to call to the enemy to surrender but the squad leader was dissatisfied with his enthusiasm, so a member of the squad who spoke German took over that assignment. One PW surrendered. The squad inspected four pillboxes and two shelters. They found the lights still on in one of the shelters and machine guns set up in one of the boxes. Fearing the latter were booby trapped they did not touch them but returned. (None of the boxes inspected caused a patrol from the MM 1st Bn any trouble when it passed them later in the day.

At the bridge (856385) "E" Co found a 47mm AT gun which had been knocked out and a 20 mm AT gun which apparently had just been pulled out of a pill box and had shrapnel thru the recoil mechanism. (Lt. English reported that a 47 and a ~~77~~ 77 mm gun had been abandoned in the same vicinity both having had their breechesblown.)

"E" Co moved northwest along the road to (856386) where they turned right to (859389). They reached this point about 1300 and were ordered to hold up. They established an all around defense and sent a squad up the road northwest on reconnaissance. The squad advanced about 400 yards and ran into a fire fight. It was then recalled and 4.2 mortar fire was laid on the area causing the enemy to depart. In the meantime "F" Co had moved up on line with "E" Co. One platoon was moved over to the right of the main road and the other just left of it. The right platoon had worked up about 100yds while the left stood ~~back~~ fast. About 200 yards up the road was a road block and in back of it was an SP gun later identified as a 77 mm. "F" Co CO thought it had been put out of action and that the platoon to the right of the road had checked it. The executive officer was curious however and took out his glasses to inspect it

more closely. (Both officers were at the aforementioned RJ). Just about that time the enemy weapon fired one round which struck the pavement near the officers, both of whom dived for cover. Artillery was called on the gun but most of it fell to the right of the road. (In a way it was fortunate that it did because the 3d Bn 26th was off in the woods not far to the left.) The gun then withdrew but not far. The two machine guns which were protecting it withdrew also.

"F" Co CO sent the left platoon up astride the road. The squad on the left side knocked out the machine gun but did not find the gun. The one on the right saw the machine gun on their side of the road but did nothing about it. Upon their return they were immediately ordered out to put it out of action, but they reported that it was gone when they returned.

At 1605 both companies were ordered forward. "E" Co CO requested his tanks to follow him. Moved to RJ (856400) without incident. They passed right by a burning ammunition dump (mortar and 105 mm ammunition) at RJ (858391). At the first mentioned RJ they halted waiting for "F" Co. While waiting on "F" Co they heard enemy artillery fire off to the northwest so a patrol was sent to the vicinity (853400). From this position the patrol could not see the enemy artillery but could see enemy activity in BUSCHLISH. Artillery and mortar fire was called for and stopped some of the activity. As the patrol was also being shelled by friendly 81mm mortar fire it returned.

At 1755 hrs "E" Co had definitely located an enemy battery at (857400) They requested a of 155's to fire on it and adjusted their fire. Three minutes later they adjusted fire on enemy at (847408), silencing both batteries at least temporarily.

In the meantime "F" Co had started to move up the main road and had run into heavy fire being exchanged between the enemy and the 3d Bn. So instead of following the main road north as planned they turned right at CR (853393) joining "E" Co at 1845.

At 1920 hrs both companies moved out, "E" Co turning right up the fire break between (857402) and (863411) stopping at the latter point for the night.

"F" Co followed the road to RJ (855404) where they turned right, the left guiding on the road on the edge of the woods. As they passed the open area left of the road they notice barracks with lights on. A reenforced sqd was sent to investigate and found the barracks on the near side empty. (These were the only ones inspected.

They had been ordered to occupy the orchard in the vicinity of SCHOLTHAL but an advance patrol found it already occupied by the enemy. By this time it was fairly dark so the company CO ordered the tanks to move in and clear up the area. The lead tank had just gotten to the vicinity (858410) when an enemy AT gun scored two direct hits, which penetrated the tank almost instantly killing the asst. driver, taking off the gunner's foot and seriously wounding two others. The other tanks immediately deployed in the woods to the right.

"F" Co then went into defensive position just inside the northeast edge of the woods, setting up a 360 degree defense and tying in with E Co on the right.

"G" Co split, part of it following E Co and the other part following F Co thus providing protection (against infiltrating enemy) for the TD's. Buttoned up southwest of the other two companies in the vicinity (858407)

That same afternoon the I and R platoon made its first patrol into the Siegfried Line, moving northeast thru the woods to RJ (855381) which had previously been cleared by the 2d Bn. They followed the road to RJ (869387) where they were fired on. Here they waited until the 1st Bn came up.

A foot patrol of eight men moved northeast, about half way through an open field to vicinity (872390) meeting no resistance. At this point further advance was impossible due to the open ground, replete with barbed wire entanglements, and commanded by a pillbox. They then returned to the regimental CP.

The 1st Bn moved from their bivouac area in the vicinity of HERGENRATH to STEINHAUL which was their assembly area. At 1530 they moved out along the same road taken by the 2d Bn to (856381). There they were to turn right to HIDENTFELD with the objective of taking the ground north and east of the town. They moved out in a column of companies, the tanks in the rear. When they turned north at RJ (858359), "B" moved off the road to the right and "C" Co moved to the left. The two lead companies moved forward two platoon columns abreast on each side of the road.

In order to protect the right flank a combat patrol of 12 men moved out at 1500. They went thru LICHTENBUSCH to the next crossroads where they turned left, thence to EICH, where they again turned left meeting the Bn CO in HIDENTFELD. The patrol had moved thru fairly open terrain past several fortifications, including Dragons Teeth and had met only scattered enemy, capturing two while suffering no casualties.

The Bn met no enemy resistance along the route but was heavily shelled by enemy artillery, causing 15 casualties. They closed in the area shown at 2000 hrs.

The balance of the story of this Bn's penetration of the Siegfried Line was written by Lt. Hadsel in connection with the 3d AD.)

The 3d Bn had practically no action during the day. "L" Co was originally ordered back to the assembly area north of HAUSET at 1330. The order was then changed and they were ordered to move north along the main road. The company advanced column of platoons to RJ (840384) encountering no opposition whatever. Here they deployed across the road and "buttoned up" for the night. The other two companies remained in place.

(The weather had been miserable, the Bn was, for the most part, deployed in thickly wooded area and were cold, wet and uncomfortable. Jeeps were getting stuck when they got off the paved roads. According to the regt. journal, the gasoline situation was quite acute, also the expenditure of ammunition was cut

considerably).

The 15th Sept the I and R platoon had the mission of reconnoitering the area northwest of BRAND. Their five jeeps proceeded in column to the RR crossing in BRAND (887405).

One jeep took a route to the right of the BRAND AACHEN road to the vicinity (878422) where it turned left to what was to have been the assembly point at CR (871417). It was unable to reach the latter because of small arms fire so an OP was set up and the men remained in observation.

The scout (2d) jeep went to (880411) where they drew small arms fire. They inspected all the barracks at this point finding them empty. They then proceeded to CR (871417). Here they were met by heavy small arms fire causing them to beat a hasty retreat. They notified the point of the 26th RCT (C Co) who went into position around that point.

The 3d jeep turned northwest from BRAND going across country to vicinity (876405), thence to (884409) without incident. They then returned to BRAND.

The same morning "G" Co was the assault Co for the 2d Bn. Reinforced by three medium tanks, 3 light tanks and two TD's it was given the mission of taking EILENDORF. The town was less than two miles from their position as the crow flies but was over three times as far by the route they had to take in order to have their right flank protected by the 3d A.D. who were moving up to the east of BRAND. They passed the IP EJ (856400) at 0900 hrs.

Meanwhile the rest of the Bn remained in place, trying to dry themselves out. Gasoline for the tanks had to be hand carried part of the way and they were somewhat hard to start. They had been running continuously the preceeding day.

"G" Co moved out in column formation, deployed on both sides of the road, the column about a half mile long. The tanks did not start quite so early and were expected to catch up with the foot troops at NIEDER FORSTBACH, but did not catch them till BRAND.

Two platoons then mounted the tanks and rode for about a quarter of a mile.

The 3d A. D. was using the same route from NIEDER FORSTBACH to RJ (896423)/ By this time they had come under enemy observation and were receiving small arms fire. The terrain was flat and open offering little protection so the foot troops dismounted and sprinted about 1500 yards across the wide open terrain into EILENDORF. All the time they were receiving machine gun fire from the high ground east of EILENDORF but there were no casualties. The three platoons set up defensive positions just south of the RR tracks.

The balance of the Bn passed the IP about 1430 after having been held up by the 1st Bn who had priority on the road. They also passed a Bn from the 26th (going in the opposite direction) who were relieving them. There was not too much confusion but they lost about an hour. The order of march was "E" Co., advance CP, "F" Co., "H" Co and 4.2's. In the rear were the balance of the tanks and organic transportation. They were marching on the road, part of the time double banked with 3d A. D., whom they were able to avoid in BRAND.

At the crest of the hill (891409) all elements were speeded up so as to cross the open area as fast as possible. The plan was to turn left at RJ (897423) "E" Co in the lead made the turn all right. It was then decided to put a sign at the junction.

Major Wozinski, 2d Bn Ex Off did not see sign so continued on up the road. He got to vicinity (897428) when he realized he was on the wrong road. He turned around and met F Co who had not seen the sign either. During this time the 3d A. D. who, apparently, were using the ground just to the east were receiving heavy artillery fire, and part of it was falling on F Co.

As mentioned before this was wide open terrain offering little cover but there was a slight draw running toward EILENDORF into which "F" Co was moved immediately to continue toward the town.

Major Wozinski returned to the RJ to be sure the lowgoing elements made the turn. He found the sign all right but the reason neither he nor "F" Co had seen it was because a 3d A. D. EM was leaning against it thus covering it up.

As he took the left (correct) road into EILENDORF he discovered six to eight Engineers' trucks and about 20 organic vehicles strung out along the road at a standstill in plain view of the enemy. The personnel were digging in for protection from enemy artillery. Maj. Wozinski raced into town and found that in the confusion no one had been instructed to direct the vehicles in town and the head of the column just stopped.

An officer was immediately assigned the task of locating a spot for them and finally found one at 885430 which offered no concealment from the air but did give defilade from enemy observation. The trucks were routed in and the Bn CP was set up in the same area, by about 1700 hrs. Major Wozinski was amazed that the enemy allowed the Bn to move at all — directly under their noses.

"E" Co was ordered to establish two roadblocks, one at (892435) and the other at (886435), guarding each with a platoon. In the meantime the 3d platoon was engaged in searching the town.

The German civilians were taken so completely by surprise that they hastily improvised white flags, ranging from babies diapers and adults' underdrawers to pieces of sheets.

"F" Co was ordered to provide flank protection to the west with their right flank resting on the RR track (which was originally thought to be a road). However the enemy on the forward slope across the tracks "could look right down our throats." So the "F" Co CO moved his company back to a line which began at approximately (880437) ran southwest to (878433) then southeast to (881432). Why the enemy across the tracks did not fire on the Bn is an unsolved mystery.

"E" Co sent a reenforced platoon to the high ground 800 yards east of EILENDORF vicinity 898440. The platoon was reenforced by a LMG section, and a demolition sqd with orders to seize the highest ground possible. They ran into too much trouble to return and since the radio was not working a messenger was dispatched to inform "E" Co CO of the situation. The messenger returned with 4 PSW reporting the pillboxes clear.

"E" Co CO wanted to take his company up to the high ground but requested additional help. He was ordered, by the Bn CO to take one platoon up, leaving the other to guard the BN CP. In addition to the platoon he took up a section of heavy machine guns and later brought up the mortar section. That night a patrol was sent out to make contact with "G" Co. No contact was made but the patrol did return with ten Psw.

Just before dark (2000 hrs) "F" Co took over two platoon positions of "G" Co. The latter moved two platoons to positions (832443), cutting the road to VERLAUTENHEIDE, and (896444) on top of the RR tunnel. At least 12 enemy were killed around the pillboxes, and eight Psw taken in this movement. "G" Co had 14 casualties from enemy fire that night.

The same day, 15 Sept., the 3d Bn moved out about 1730. They moved along the road in column of companies, column of platoons. The order of march was I, K and L. The 3d AD was still on the same route and that with the Bn organic transportation made the road crowded. Enemy air was over the road, causing the personnel to deploy but not the vehicles. No hostile act was committed, however. The head of the column reached BRAND about 1905 without incident.

"L" Co deployed in the vicinity (890447), "K" Co (891419) and "I" around the barracks, guarding the 16th RCT, CP and cutting the AACHEN-BRAND road vicinity (875415). The night was quiet.

On the 16th Sep "F" Co moved to a position along the road east between EILENDORF and ATSCH. A platoon was sent out to a pillbox at (911436) as an out-post. The next day it was called back in. "G" and "E" companies remained in place improving their positions.

In the meantime "K" Co moved to EILENDORF without difficulty and occupied much the same positions as those held by "F" and "G" companies the night before. "L" Co moved to a position about a km west of EILENDORF (as shown). "I" Co remained in place.

On the afternoon of the 16th Sep "G" Co sent a platoon up to VERLAUTENHEIDE on reconnaissance. Prior to their reaching the town a friendly tank pulled up to the crest of the hill and fired six rounds on the left (west) edge of the town. They immediately got five or six rounds back which landed "awful close," so withdrew.

Upon reaching town the platoon could see the enemy marching southeast toward VERLAUTENHEIDE in a column of twos "as far as the eye could see." The platoon was then pulled back suffering 2 K.I.A., 9 W.I.A., and 2 M.I.A.


That night "G" Co heard considerable vehicular traffic in the above town. They "threw Div Arty in on it," and may have broken up an attack from the north.

About 170100 Sep an enemy patrol of nine men came into "G" Co's position. Seven were killed and two escaped. About 0530 the enemy mortar and arty barrage began. It extended from EILENDORF eastward covering the whole of "G" and "E" Companies. It was estimated that 4,000 mortar and another 4,000 arty shells landed in the companies' area. The arty barrage lasted till about 0600 hrs.

A gap of about 100 yds existed between the two companies.

Immediately after the barrage lifted two enemy companies attacked with fixed bayonets (the first time this Bn had experienced a bayonet attack.) Each enemy company ~~xx~~ consisted of about 150 men and were from the 12th Inf. Div. According to the company officers interviewed it was one of the best outfits the enemy had.

The positions of the platoons were as follows:



Enemy attacks

(Not drawn to scale)

The terrain in front of "E" Co was rather heavily wooded whereas that on "G's" left front and left flank was quite open.

The heaviest attacks came against the 1st platoon of "G" Co, located on their right flank. The next heaviest was on their center platoon with the 3d (left flank) platoon catching the overflow. On the right flank one squad ran out of ammunition and had to withdraw, the enemy occupying their positions. On the left front the enemy got to within 150 yards of their positions.

On E Co's front the approach, being wooded, was much better covered and the enemy got to within a few yards of their positions.

Friendly (Div) arty, 4.2 mortars, a Bn of tanks, and other supporting weapons fired on the enemy and finally repulsed them. The situation was under control by 0800 - 0830 hrs.

The second assault on "G" Co came about noon. ("E" Co had kept them disorganized in the woods with mortar and arty fire). The strength of the enemy attack was about the same as the first. They were well disciplined troops and kept coming in spite of their losses. They got almost as close in as they had in the morning and were stopped only after they had become completely disorganized by losses. Artillery and mortar fire, plus small arms broke up the attack by about 1400.

However, some of the enemy from these two attacks were still in the foxholes on the right flank. About 1600 friendly arty, mortar, MG and rifle fire was laid on the overrun position. One squad attacked by short rushes and a generous use of hand grenades and regained the positions. The few remaining enemy in the foxholes were killed.

About 1800 the third attack was made on "G" Co in about the same strength and in much the same manner as the other two. About 12 enemy reached the position and they were killed by hand grenades. The ^{enemy} could be heard yelling to Attack, Attack but were kept from it by the intense rifle and MG fire of G Co, and the left flank of E Co. One PW said they had never "run up against such devastating small arms fire." The right platoon of G Co averaged six bandoleers of M-1 ammunition per man.

About 2000 hrs the enemy retired evacuating a few wounded and dead (believed to be officers). Many wounded died in the area in front of "G" and "E" companies. In the wooded area the enemy outpost line was not much over 70 - 100 yds in front of "G" and "E" Co lines.

The casualties suffered by these two cos are as follows:

	K.I.A.	W,I.A.	M.I.A.
"G" Co	2 E M	3 Off. 14 EM	0
"E" Co	0	14 (lightly)	0

That afternoon "F" Co moved forward and occupied positions along the road from RJ (900437) to trail J (905432). That night "I" Co moved in and filled the gap between "G" and "E" companies, thus closing the gap slightly to the rear. "E" and "G" companies both shifted slightly to the left.

During the night mortar and arty fire continued to fall on "G" Co's position. About 180200 Sep an estimated co of enemy attacked "G" Co. Some of them succeeded in getting into the position but did not penetrate it. One machine gunner killed two enemy with his pistol and they fell across the barrel of his weapon. One enemy platoon was wiped out almost to a man. About 0300 they withdrew. The "G" Co men were "jumpy" and fired at any noise they heard. Sniping continued on ~~the~~ both sides the rest of the night. The same morning about 0530 hrs an extremely heavy mortar and arty barrage fell on "E" Co.

About 0600 one platoon of enemy made a "fanatical attempt" to charge the slope, which was virtually a cliff, in front of the 1st (right) platoon. The men literally "dropped" hand grenades on them as they climbed the slope. Friendly mortar fire was dropping within 35 yards of this position. Only four enemy reached the top of the hill, and ~~thence~~ they were immediately killed.

On the left flank there was a pillbox in the 3d platoon's position at (897442). One squad was defending it from foxholes. Under cover of darkness the enemy worked their way in close enough to drive the men out of their foxholes

into the pillbox. The enemy then attached a beehive to the door, blowing it in, and causing six casualties. The other six men crawled out the embrasure and using rifles and MGs drove the enemy off, inflicting heavy casualties.

By this time it was daylight. One platoon of enemy moved forward out of the woods to avoid American mortar fire and temporarily huddled together in squad groups. A light machine gun section, caught them "killing them all." Those that were wounded were also killed.

By noon this attack was cleared up. The 2d platoon and the MG section expended 30,000 rounds of ammunition. E Co suffered the following casualties: 1 KIA, 10 WIA.

At 1400 hrs another platoon of enemy attacked "G" Co from the front. They got to within 50 yds of the position before they were repulsed. A "G" Co aid man went out to help a wounded enemy when enemy opened fire and he was wounded by "what was believed to be a dum dum bullet." "G" Co suffered seven WIA during the day.

16-17

During the hard ~~stay~~ fighting of ~~17~~/Sept the crews of the medium tanks and light tanks dismounted from their vehicles which were defiladed to the rear and fought on foot with the infantry of "G" and "E" companies, using the machine guns brought from their tanks, and accounting for enemy casualties.

About 1100 of 17 Sept one medium tank from its position at (888448) was sent north up the road to knock out the enemy pill box and house at (887452). An enemy SP gun was behind the house, from which position it was hitting "G" Co infantry positions to the south. The medium tank blasted the pillbox and house, and chased the SP gun; but the tankers were not certain it was knocked out.

Between 16 Sep and 24 Sep "K" and "L" Co's sat tight in the vicinity northwest EILENDORF without much trouble, other than mortar and arty fire.

On the 24th Sep "K" Co 18th RCT relieved "K" Co 16th RCT who moved to the road west of MUNSTERBUSCH. The following day "I" Co 18th RCT relieved "L" Co 16th RCT who moved to the area to the right of "K", 16th, thus relieving "L" Co 18th RCT. (The map shows the woods incorrectly. The left flank of "L" Co is right along the edge of the woods.)